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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Regardless what the legislaturq entitled the act, Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-15-3 (1953) is a statute of repose. The legisla-
ture enacted this measure to address the problem of increasing 
costs of liability insurance caused, in part, by the insurance 
industry's concern about liability for product-related injuries 
which might occur long after the date of manufacture or sale of a 
product. The legislature did not intend to replace existing sta-
tutes of limitation which operated to bat actions by persons who, 
although aware of their injuries, nevertheless slept on their 
rights. Indeed, to interpret the statute of repose as a measure 
allowing the plaintiff here to delay filing his claim would be 
directly contrary to the legislature's purpose "to expedite early 
evaluation and settlement of claims." (Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-15-2(3) (1953)). 
Plaintiff erroneously bases hi$ position on mechanical 
application of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1 (1953) and rigid reliance 
on inapplicable maxims of statutory construction. He has not 
cited a single case in which a court addressing the ultimate issue 
has supported his position. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE TITLE OF THE ACT DOES NOT CONTROL 
THE MEANING OF THE STATUTE. 
The plaintiff argues that Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3 (1953) 
is a statute of limitation, because the title of the act contains 
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the phrase, "establishing a statute of limitations." However, 
this Court has previously recognized that the title of an act does 
not control the meaning of the statute where the language of the 
statute is unambiguous. (American Smelting & Refining Co. v. 
State Tax Commission, 16 Utah 2d 147, 150; 397 P.2d 67, 70 
(1964)). 
In Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 
1985), this Court concluded that Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3 (1953) 
was a statute of repose because the time period commenced to run 
upon the occurrence of an event other than the date of injury 
giving rise to the cause of action and because the statute was not 
designed to allow a reasonable time within which to file an action 
once a cause of action accrued. Since the statutory language is 
unambiguous, the legislature's designation of the statute as a 
statute of limitation is not controlling. 
POINT II: IN ENACTING THE STATUTE OF REPOSE, 
THE LEGISLATURE DID NOT INTEND TO 
PREEMPT STATUTES OF LIMITATION 
WHICH WOULD OTHERWISE BAR AN INJURED 
PARTY'S CLAIM. 
A. The legislature enacted the statute of repose to address a 
perceived problem of rising insurance rates. 
The Utah Legislature stated its purpose for enacting the 
Utah Products Liability Act in Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-2 (1953), 
expressing its concern about the rising number of suits and size 
of judgments rendered in product liability actions and perceiving 
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that these actions had an adverse impact on the cost and availabi-
lity of liability insurance. One of the principal factors contri-
buting to the rise in insurance rates was the continuing risk of 
liability for injuries caused by products long after the product's 
date of manufacture or sale. One coirpnentator summarized the 
insurance industry's concern about thjis "tail exposure" as 
follows: 
The threat of claims based on injuries caused 
by older products is cited as one of the most 
significant causes of the increased insurance 
rates. A products liability insurance policy 
typically covers all products claims made 
during the period that the policy is in force. 
While manufacturers and their insurers are sub-
ject to claims involving products manufactured 
during the present insurance period, they are 
also liable for injuries stemming from pre-
viously manufactured products. Therefore, 
well-established manufacturers of long-lasting 
products are exposed to a great degree of risk 
due to large numbers of previously manufactured 
products that are still in use. Many old pro-
ducts were produced during the time when the 
public was less safety-conscious than it is now 
and before manufacturers faced governmental 
pressures to produce safe products. Many manu-
facturers are facing claims based on products 
that were built prior to the advent of modern 
principles of strict tort liability. Although 
the number of claims actually predicated upon 
old products represents a very s^ riall portion of 
the total number of products liability claims, 
the potential for liability from these old pro-
ducts has created a considerable concern on the 
part of insurers that is reflected in higher 
premiums. 
Note, Alabama's Products Liability Statute of Repose, 11 
Cumberland L. Rev. 163, 166 (1980). 
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The Utah Legislature enacted the statute of repose, Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-15-3 (1953), to redress the problem of "tail 
exposure." The legislature intended to reduce uncertainty and 
risk by immunizing manufacturers and persons in their chains of 
distribution six years after sale or ten years after manufacture 
of their products. 
B. In contrast to statutes of repose, statutes of limitation 
focus on the behavior of the injured party once the cause of 
action arises. 
As noted in the defendants1 opening brief, the legisla-
ture enacts statutes of limitation to protect defendants from 
stale claims asserted after evidence is lost, memories have faded, 
and witnesses have disappeared. It has long been the policy of 
the law to encourage injured parties who are aware of their 
injuries to submit their claims for early resolution. The sole 
focus of a statute of limitation is upon the behavior of the 
injured party. If an injured person does not act timely, the per-
son waives his or her remedy. 
A commentator emphasized the difference in focus between 
statutes of repose and statutes of limitation as follows: 
Historically, statutes of limitation prevented 
plaintiffs from sleeping on their legal rights 
to the detriment of defendants. The focus in 
the traditional statutes was upon the conduct 
of the plaintiff. If the plaintiff did not 
bring his cause of action in a timely manner, 
the statute of limitations deprived him of the 
opportunity to seek judicial redress for an 
otherwise valid claim. Statutes of repose, 
however, focus on the age of a product rather 
than on the plaintiff's conduct. They absolu-
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tely bar all claims when products exceed the 
statutory age limitation and completely deprive 
a plaintiff of his rights merely because he has 
been injured by an older product. 
Dickson, The Statute of Limitations in North Dakota's Products 
Liability Act; An Exercise in Futility?, 5 9 N.D. L. Rev. 552, 
556-557 (1983). 
Because the premises underlying the two types of statutes 
differ, the enactment of one type of statute does not automati-
cally repeal previously enacted statutes of the other type. 
Certainly, that is the case here. Obviously, tfie legislature's 
desire to enact a measure to curb rising insurance rates did not 
supplant or eliminate the legislature's previously expressed 
policy that injured parties, well aware of their injuries, must 
bring their actions timely or waive their remedies. 
C. Plaintiff's contention is contrary t<^  the legislature's 
expressed intent. 
In Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-2 (3) (1953) , the Utah Legis-
lature stated its intent to enact measures "to expedite early eva-
luation and settlement of claims." [Emphasis added.] However, the 
plaintiff has taken the incongruous position that these legisla-
tive measures actually validate his delay in presenting his claim 
for evaluation and resolution. Plaintiff attempts to support this 
anomalous position by inviting the Court to mechanically apply 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1 (1953) or indiscriminately employ maxims 
of statutory construction. 
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POINT III: UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-1 (1953) DOES NOT 
PRECLUDE OPERATION OF THE TWO YEAR 
LIMITATION ON THIS WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION. 
A. Statutes must not be mechanically applied according to their 
literal terms without reasoned analysis. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1 (1953) reads as follows: 
Civil actions can be commenced only within the 
periods prescribed in this chapter, after the 
cause of action shall have accrued, except 
where in special cases a different limitation 
is prescribed by statute. 
The plaintiff argues that the Utah Products Liability Act statute 
of repose is a special case prescribing a different limitation. 
Although the argument has superficial appeal, it does not 
withstand reasoned analysis. 
In Snyder v. Clune, 15 Utah 2d 254, 390 P.2d 915 (1964), 
this Court notssd that mechanical application of a statute in the 
absence of proper analysis may lead to anomalous results. In 
Snyder, the plaintiff sought damages from a non-resident motorist 
for personal injuries suffered in an automobile accident. 
Although the plaintiff filed her action after the four-year limi-
tation period had run, she argued that the action was timely, 
because the literal terms of a tolling statute appeared to apply 
to actions against non-residents. After observing that the plain-
tiff could have served process on the lieutenant governor as agent 
for the non-motorist under the non-resident motorist statute any 
time during the four year period, the Court commented: 
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It is to be conceded that upon a superficial 
look at the above section [Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-35 (1953)], ignoring all other con-
siderations, its literal wording might seem to 
indicate that where a defendant departs from 
the state after a cause of action arises, the 
time of his absence should not be counted as 
part of the time of limitation. But statutes 
of necessity must state their objectives in 
general language. It is not always possible to 
foresee and prescribe in precise detail for all 
situations to which they might apply. Attempts 
to give them universal and literal application 
frequently lead to incongruous results which 
were never intended. When it is obvious that 
this is so, the statute should not be so 
applied. 
15 Utah 2d at pp. 255; 390 P.2d at pp. 913-916. Just as the Court 
in Snyder refused to superficially examine and mechanically apply 
the tolling provision, so should the Court here refrain from 
applying the literal terms of Utah Cod£ Ann. § 78-12-1 (1953) 
without proper analysis. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1 (1953) particularly illustrates 
the principle that the legislature cannot always foresee in pre-
cise detail all situations to which the sftatute might apply. The 
legislature enacted the Utah Products Liability Act in 1977. This 
enactment responded to a movement promoting statutes of repose 
which started in the late 1950fs and earl^ 1960fs. (McGovern, The 
Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of Product Liability 
Statutes of Repose, 30 Am. U.L. Rev. 579, 587 (1981)). By 
contrast, the language now appearing as btah Code Ann. § 78-12-1 
(1953) has been the law of Utah since 1876, having been previously 
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designated as Comp. Laws 1876 § 1095; 2 Comp. Laws 1888 § 3129; 
R.S. 1898 § 2855; Comp. Laws 1907 § 2855; Utah Code Ann. § 104-2-1 
(1943); and Utah Code Ann. § 104-12-1 (1943 Supp.). Obviously, 
the legislature in 1876 did not envision the emergence of modern 
statutes of repose, and a mechanical application of the statute 
leads to the type of incongruous result against which this Court 
warned in Snyder. 
B. The legislature's intent in enacting the Utah Product 
Liability Act statute of repose determines the applicability 
of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1 (1953). 
In Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934 (Utah 
1980), the plaintiff, who had not timely filed a medical malprac-
tice action against the defendant, asserted that a tolling provi-
sion must be read in conjunction with the limitation period 
prescribed by the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. After citing 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-1 (1953), the Court stated that in order to 
determine whether subsequent legislation superseded existing pro-
visions of Title 78, Chapter 12, the Court must consider the 
legislative motive in enacting the subsequent legislation. (609 
P.2d at 936). Because the legislature did not intend the Utah 
Product Liability Act statute of repose to supersede existing 
statutes of limitations in the circumstances of this case (see 
discussion in Point II), Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1 (1953) does not 
applyf and the two year limitation on wrongful death actions, Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-L2-28(2) (1953), bars the plaintiff's claim. 
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POINT IV: THE PLAINTIFFfS RELIANCE ON MAXIMS OF 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION IS MISPLACED AND 
IGNORES THE LEGISLATURE'S INTENT IN 
ENACTING THE UTAH PRODUCT LIABILITY 
ACT. 
A. The plaintiff bases his argument on a fatally flawed assump-
tion. 
The plaintiff argues that statutory construction prin-
ciples mandate the conclusion that the two-year wrongful death 
limitation does not bar his action. Hi^ argument commences with 
the assumption that statutes of limitation and statutes of repose 
are indistinguishable and interchangeable. The argument proceeds 
on a corollary to his assumption—statutory construction prin-
ciples used to choose between two competihg statutes of limitation 
can also be used to choose between a statute of repose and a sta-
tute of limitation. As demonstrated in the defendants1 opening 
brief and Points I and II heref the plaintiff's assumption is 
erroneous, thus invalidating the succeeding corollary and the 
resulting conclusion. 
B. Maxims of statutory construction do not have the force of law 
and are useful only if they assist in ascertaining the 
legislature's intent. 
This Court has always cautioned that statutory construc-
tion principles are only means to an end and do not have the force 
of law. In Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake County, 568 P.2d 738 (Utah 
1977), Salt Lake County asserted that it was entitled to collect 
fees from Salt Lake City under a statutory interpretation based on 
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recognized statutory maxims. In addressing the countyfs argument, 
the Court stated: 
But helpful as rules of construction often are, 
they are useful guides, but poor masters; and 
they should not be regarded as having any such 
rigidity as to have the force of law, or 
distort an otherwise natural meaning or intent. 
Their only ligitimate function is to assist in 
ascertaining the true intent and purpose of the 
statute. 
Id. at p. 741. The legislature's intent in enacting the Utah 
Products Liability Act is clear from the legislature's own stated 
intent, the perceived problem it addressed, and the statutory 
device it employed to resolve the problem. (See discussion Point 
II). Because the legislature's intent is clear, there is no need 
to resort to the maxims of dubious applicability upon which the 
plaintiff so rigidly relies. 
POINT V: THE PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO CITE A 
SINGLE CASE SUPPORTING HIS POSITION ON 
THE ULTIMATE ISSUE PRESENTED BY THIS 
CROSS-APPEAL. 
The plaintiff has taken issue with the cases cited by the 
defendants in which courts have held that a statute of repose does 
not extend to time to file an action beyond the time permitted by 
the applicable statute of limitation. Although these courts 
interpreted architects', builders', and engineers' statutes, they 
rendered their decisions based on principles applicable to all 
statutes of repose. That such universal principles exist is amply 
demonstrated by Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P. 2d 670 (Utah 
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1985) in which this Court surveyed decisions interpreting archi-
tects1, builders1, engineers1 and medical malpractice statutes of 
repose as well as product liability statutes. (See, 717 P.2d at 
677-678). 
Although the plaintiff argues that the defendants1 cases 
do not apply to product liability statutes of repose, he has 
utterly failed to cite any case interpreting any statute of repose 
which supports his position on the ultimate issue presented by 
this cross-appeal. Indeed, to defendants1 knowledge, such a case 
does not exist. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the Utah Legislature ijiever intended the Utah 
Product Liability Act statute of repose to extend the time in 
which the plaintiff could file his action^ the defendants respect-
fully submit that the Court should reverse the trial court's April 
28, 1983 order. 
DATED this _^__ day of September, 1986. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
By / *'\ s -'^> ">[ * / " 
L. Rich Humpherys 
M. Douglas Bayly 
Attorneys for Defendants Saab 
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